[As a confession, this is the second draft of my response to Randal Rauser. My first draft was written in the wrong spirit and was more of a disrespectful screed than a levelheaded criticism. Rauser indirectly brought this to my attention by noting the ‘inflammatory’ and ‘insulting’ nature of the blog. After considering this criticism, I took down the entire blog. Rauser responded in good spirits by encouraging me that taking down the entire blog wasn’t necessary, that I only needed to edit out the inflammatory parts, which seemed to be a good call. If my entire ethos has been harmed to some (or all), I can only blame myself; but here goes what I hope to be mostly logos with some pathos sprinkled on top.]
This is a response to a (to my eyes) cynical take by Christian apologist and writer Randal Rauser on his blog regarding the politics of William Lane Craig. Up front I should inform the reader that I voted for Donald Trump twice, I consider myself a Christian, and that my politics are probably diametrically opposed to Rauser’s. This will be born out by Rauser’s choice of sources, the perspective he takes on the political issues he raises, and a seeming failure to appreciate the fact that good, practicing Christians can take more than one perspective on a certain subset of issues - another sort of meta-debate to be had here (and a theme that will come up a lot below) is the debate about what criteria determines which issues are non-negotiable for Christians qua Christians and which are not.
[I guess I should add that I really like Rauser's perspective when it comes to apologetics. He has good stuff when he talks about his theory of inspiration. - edit: Rauser’s reaction to my first screed was actually very measured and spiritual mature, which bespeakes a cultivated character . . . ]
Rauser's Two-Point Critique of Craig
Rauser's blog is a two-point response to this transcription of Craig's ReasonFaith Podcast:
And he’s also, I think, inaccurately characterizing me. I have never endorsed Donald Trump or Republicanism. I have tried to stay out of politics except when it concerns an issue of ethical importance. I am unabashedly pro-life, for example, and in favor of heterosexual marriage because I think those are biblical values and ethical issues that Christians need to stand for. But I stay out of politics and the sorts of things that Randal is talking about there. I don’t even regard those things that he had on his list there as being relevant to my task.
Before I get to Rauser’s ‘two-point critique’, let me unpack what I think this quote means. When Craig says he never endorsed Trump or Repulicanism, I’m taking it as axiomatic that Craig is telling the truth and that there’s nothing nefarious lurking beneath the surface. In other words, this confession is, for me, part of my ‘evidence-base’, that subset of my epistemic priors that’ll be used to assess everything that comes after. In order to convince me otherwise, Rauser will need to bring up evidence otherwise, or present an argument against the adequacy of my entire approach.
The third sentence here - to me - is a general statement whose precise meaning is fleshed out more in the fourth sentence. It generality lies in the potential ambiguity of the phrase ‘issue of ethical importance’. Making it the main, clear, unambiguous sentence by which to interpret the rest leads Rauser to bring up a series of other ‘issues of ethical importance’ and complain about Craig’s silence about these matters. But, for me, I interpret the phrase in light of the fourth sentence, specifically, the part where Craig provides a reason for why he considers being pro-life and for heterosexual marriage are ‘issues of ethical importance’: ‘ethical issues that Christians need to stand for’. This puts a new light on the phrase. It says that Craig isn’t only talking about issues of ethical importance generally; he is talking about those issues of ethical importance for which we, just by virtue of being a Christian, ‘need to stand for’. This presupposes a distinction between those issues of ethical importance for which good, consistent, practicing Christians can disagree about and those issues of ethical importance for which good, consistent, practicing Christians cannot disagree about.
This may be the crux of the disagreement I have with Rauser. I think I can make a case for the fact that all the ‘issues of ethical importance’ Rauser lists are issues about which good, consistent, practicing Christians can disagree, whereas Rauser sees these issues as ones about which Christians cannot disagree. Unfortunately, it’ll be impossible for me to unpack all the reasons I have for thinking that Rauser’s list of issues fall into the former category, reasons that will be completely insufficient to convince Rauser. But hopefully Rauser can see that there is another interpretive framework through which to see the interrelationship this distinction has to the issues Craig brings up, the issues he brings up, and why those issues are brought up in the context they’re brought up in, rather than other issues.
The last sentence supports my case. When Craig says that the things on ‘his’ (Rauser’s) list aren’t ‘relevant to my task’, my interpretation of Craig seems to fit perfectly. What is relevant to Craig’s task and what is this task? Well, it seems that part of what’s relevant to Craig’s task is to make a stand for Biblical values and ethical issues we need to stand for, just by virtue of being a Christian (meaning, not by virtue of being a member of a political party). But there is an indirect catch. It doesn’t seem inconceivable to think that there are ethical issues endorsed by one or another political party that may overlap contingently with those ‘issues of ethical importance’ that are non-negotiable for Christians, issues about which good, practicing, consistent Christians cannot disagree. It’s at this contingent overlap that Rauser will begin to speculate about underlying, non-obvious connections to the party affiliations of the ReasonableFaith ministry, threatening the ministry’s guidelines for legally remaining tax-exempt, a speculation I personally found distasteful and based on overreaching generalizations from an insufficient evidence-base.
So, reader, this is where I’m coming from. In light of all of this, let’s see Rauser's two-point critique.
1. Rauser's First Point: Issues of Ethical Importance
So, let me start quoting Rauser from his blog and comment briefly. Bold is mine.
Craig says that he only involves himself in politics when it concern issues of “ethical importance.” He then gives two examples: a pro-life stance and an, er, “pro heterosexual marriage” stance. While I’m admittedly not entirely sure what the latter is supposed to mean, I assume that is a roundabout way of saying that Craig doesn’t think same-sex marital unions should be recognized by the state. Those are the examples of issues that Craig thinks are of “ethical importance” such that they warrant a Christian apologist to speak out.
Rauser misinterprets what Craig meant by the qualification ‘Christians need to stand for’. Rauser takes this to mean ‘such that they warrant a Christian apologist to speak out’. I did not interpret it this way and I don’t think there’s warrant to opt for this interpretation. What Craig seems to mean (for me) by ‘Christians need to stand for’ is this: there are certain non-negotiable issues of ethical importance that good, practicing, consistent Christians cannot disagree about. He’s not specifically talking about Christian apologists here, or ‘the warrant’ an ethical issue might provide such an apologist to ‘speak out’. Craig is making a general qualification that applies to all Christians, a qualification that applies to Craig, not insofar as he is an apologist, but insofar as he is a Christian. Perhaps Rauser meant to emphasize ‘Christian’ rather than ‘apologist’, but no such emphasis was provided. If my interpretation is correct, we can bring in the distinction I mentioned above to explain why Craig opted for the two issues of ethical importance he chose to mention.
As for what Craig means when he stands by heterosexual marriage, we’d have to ask him. Rauser’s interpretation is probably close to the truth.
With all of this in mind, we can see why Rauser is so confused at this point. My explanation is that Rauser has launched into his critique based upon a faulty interpretation of what Craig meant, where Craig’s meaning has the distinction I mentioned.
Rauser says:
But what about public, not-for-profit healthcare that guarantees medical coverage to the least of these? Isn’t that an ethical issue? What about gun control? Surely that is an ethical issue, isn’t it? What about climate change and environmental laws to protect ecosystems including vulnerable animal and human populations? Isn’t that ethical? What about a program like DACA that would allow children of some illegal immigrants to have a path to citizenship? Isn’t that an ethical issue? What about a living wage and the growing chasm between the uber-rich and everyone else? Isn’t that an ethical issue? Why, of all the possible issues Craig could talk about, does he only opine on abortion and, um, “heterosexual marriage”?
The explanation I provide seems to answer that final question there. It explains why Craig mentioned the two issues he did. Not only were they issues of ethical importance, they were non-negotiable issues of ethical importance about which good, practicing, consistent Christians cannot disagree. There are more issues, of course, But these two issues have contingent overlap with politics and are hot-button issues that polarize along party lines. Remember, Craig tries to ‘stay out of politics’ except insofar as his non-negotiable Christian principles contingently overlap with politics (for which ‘Christians need to stand for’), not by virtue of party affiliation, but by virtue of Christian conviction, which conviction may or may not overlap with the ever-shifting views of political parties.
I’m not sure what Rauser means when he inserts ‘um’ prior to the issue of heterosexual marraige. I can only speculate that he disagrees here? If so, then Craig-types and Rauser-types need to supplement that debate with another debate about whether being for or against this issue is one of the non-negotiables. I believe it is.
The explanation also undermines any concern Rauser may have about ‘Craig’s apologetic’.
This brings me back to my concern about Craig’s apologetic. When skeptics of Christianity rightly recognize the enormous ethical import of issues like gun control, climate change, wealth inequality, and refugees, and they see that none of these issues are of sufficient concern that they warrant a mention from Craig, when they see, rather, that the two issues he mentions here are abortion and “heterosexual marriage,” that speaks volumes. It speaks about an impoverished moral vision, one tied to partisan party politics. And that effectively weakens the force of Craig’s apologetic overall.
For all we know, Craig (as a private, American, concerned, politically-conscious citizen) has a view about all the issues of ‘ethical import’ Rauser mentions. When Rauser uses the phrases ‘issues of sufficient concern’ and ‘warrant a mention from Craig’, one wonders, ‘what kinds of issues of sufficient concern?’, ‘sufficient relative to what?’, ‘concern for whom?’, ‘warrant relative to what?’, ‘mention from Craig qua concerned American citizen, Christian apologist, or Christian simpliciter?’. The first question needs to be answered in terms of the distinction above, the second question needs to be specified in light of that distinction (Craig may find such issues as sufficient concern in another context of discussion, a discussion where explicit political stances can be confessed and argued about openly and consistently, outside the purpose/scope of ReasonableFaith ministries), the third question is cleared up by the distinction (Craig qua American citizen or Craig qua Christian or Craig qua Christian apologist ‘outside’ the purpose/scope of RF ministries or Craig qua Christian apologist ‘inside’ such a purpose/scope), and so applies directly to the fourth.
Without any of these nuances in mind, as explained by the distinction, you’ll have an impoverished perspective on Craig’s blurb. My interpretation explains why Craig said the issues he did, didn’t mention any of the issues Rauser is wondering about, and why mentioning the two that Craig did doesn’t imply ‘an impoverished moral vision’ ‘tied to partisan politics’, an implication that is just unfounded to me. If there is incidental, contingent overlap between the two issues and party politics, you shouldn’t understand this relationship as some kind of tethering or rigid designation. It’s completely accidental. To read into this relationship anything nefarious or surreptitious is unwarranted. And there’s no warrant for thinking that Craig has an impoverished moral vision. Rauser is conceptually plucking Craig as understood in a certain capacity in a certain context, generalizing to Craig as a whole, and faulting Craig as a whole for not living up to standards that only apply if Craig is understood in a different capacity.
At this point, and on the basis of his erroneous interpretation, Rausal will now begin to bring up specific political issues of ethical importance from a particular political perspective such that if you take that perspective, then the moral outrage, the condemnatory adjectives, the cartoonishly evil descriptions of the political policies, and their horrific and tragic consequences are all brought into descriptive relief.
Consider one of the most wicked and vicious policies of the Trump era. Beginning in April 2018, the Trump administration instituted a new family separation policy to deter new refugee claimants. According to this policy, children (even infants) would be separated from their parents and placed in shelters while the parents waited in detention facilities for their claims to be processed. The purpose of this policy was to deter future refugee claimants with the threat that they would lose their children. The policy resulted in hundreds of children being separated from parents for months and even years. As of May 2021, the Biden administration was still working to reunite children that had been separated from their parents by the Trump administration.
In my first draft, I briefly (too briefly) weighed into (for better or worse) what a politically conservative perspective might be on this issue, but I now see that this would distract me. All it would do is open a series of mini-debates on particular political issues of ethical importance. But that would almost play by the rules of the game as Rauser has set it up. All I think I need to do here is make an overall dialectical point. If Craig (again, we’d have to ask him) agrees with Rauser, he’ll agree with his analysis, description, and moral outrage here. As for myself, I disagree with his analysis, would give a different description, and so any moral outrage I have will be directed elsewhere. But I want to ask a different question, a question that I think lies at (or near) the heart of political discourse in this country. What do we think of the people that disagree with us on political issues of ethical importance?
In answering that question, I find myself disagreeing with Rauser’s approach here. His approach disagrees with the distinction I had above by collapsing it into a whole array of non-negotiable political issues of ethical importance about which Christians cannot disagree. When you collapse it this way, it’s also important to notice another distinction just in case one of the issues Rauser does raise happens to be a non-negotiable within the context of not collapsing my distinction: that between understanding your moral outrage as you’ve described an issue and disagreeing with the way in which you’ve described an issue, or, understanding your moral outrage on the basis of the cogency of your analysis and disagreeing with the cogency of your analysis.
If I disagree with the cogency of your analysis or the accuracy of your description, then, other things being equal, this isn’t necessarily because of some moral defect on my part. If it is, this will have to come out later and on other grounds. At the outset, all we have here are two parties disagreeing in good faith, both parties thinking that they’re reasoning successfully from Christian, or at least moral, principles. Now, if you're reasoning from Christian/moral principles, that assumes both parties have Christian/moral principles. If both parties have Christian/moral principles, then both parties are arguing about an issue for which Christians can disagree. People on both sides can believe that good, practicing, consistent Christians are on the other side.
But this introduces a point about debate etiquette. I submit that it’s a point of etiquette, in this context, to not provide an analysis or a description without admitting your political biases up front, and to not express moral outrage without first making explicit that the moral legitimacy of such an outrage (in any particular case) is tied to whether or not someone sees the cogency of your analysis and the accuracy of your description. This prevents you from looking wide-eyed at your political opposition as an object of harsh moral opprobrium if they don’t agree with your descriptions and/or analysis. It prevents me from saying something like, “If you don’t agree with my take on Trump’s border policy, you are a bad person or morally blind or what have you.”
So, to circle back to my question about what we should think about people that disagree with us on political issues of ethical importance, Rauser is doing something that isn’t maximally profitable here. In opening up a can of worms (Trump’s border policy), he’s positioning Craig (and people like myself) into an unfair position. He’s luring Craig into what is most certainly going to turn into an interminable debate about the pros and cons of the policy specifically, the accuracy/cogency of Rauser’s description/analysis, the accuracy/cogency of some counter-description/counter-analysis, and all the while, there will be this unmentioned, but weird feeling in the back of the minds of people on both sides of the issue that one’s opposition on an issue means that the opposition is morally defective in some way. All of this is a bad way to begin to talk about these types of issues.
Let’s be clear about something: torture is the punitive infliction of severe physical and/or psychological/emotional suffering. When the Trump administration separated parents from their children for crossing the border and claiming refugee status, they were engaged in a policy of psychological and emotional torture. When my daughter was four years old, she went missing for 45 minutes. I still tear up recalling the anguish I experienced at that time. Now try to imagine what it would be like to have your four-year-old taken away and you are not reunited for months or years. That was a policy of the Trump administration. It was a wicked, cruel policy that violated international law.
This illustrates some of the points I made above very well. All good, practicing, consistent Christians can agree on the definition of torture Rauser provides (even though words like ‘severe’ and ‘suffering’ need to be finessed more). This seems to be a bedrock concept on which moral axioms or principles, parts of the Toa C.S. Lewis talks about in The Abolition of Man, can be understood, axioms like ‘you ought not torture’ or ‘you ought not to inflict morally abhorrent suffering’, and such like. And, indeed, if Trump separated kids from their parents claiming refugee status, and they really were refugees, then, other things being equal, I might agree that Trump’s policy involved torture, making the policy and Trump immoral. That is, if Rauser’s description and analysis are correct, or - at the very lease - if I agree with it, then, other things being equal, I ought to agree that the policy and anyone supporting the policy (knowing it involves torture) are immoral.
The problem is that Rauser’s opposition aren’t going to understand the situation strictly in these terms. Thus, Rauser’s opposition can agree with the parts of the Toa Rauser points out, but disagree with the way he applies those parts to the issue of ethical importance under discussion. At this stage, there needs to be a space where issues can be discussed and debated in good faith without framing things in such a way that you paint all opposition in a way that makes them immoral just by virtue of their disagreement. I’ll return this favor to Rauser himself. Though I think his description is off, his analysis flawed, and therefore his moral outrage misguided, I don’t think this makes Rauser a bad person at all. He is a principled person courageously standing by what he thinks to be bedrock morally non-negotiable, Christian positions in politics. I also think some positions can be debated and argued about without casting the opposition in terms that make them immoral just because they disagree.
More could be said but I think that should suffice. Let’s move on to Rauser’s second point.
2. Craig's non-support for Trump/Republican party
Rauser starts off:
There’s an old saying: don’t spit on my boots and tell me it’s raining. I thought of that when I heard Craig say “I have never endorsed Donald Trump or Republicanism.” For Exhibit A, I would invite folks to listen to the May 31, 2020 episode of Reasonable Faith titled “Will there be a backlash against evangelicals?” in which Craig addresses the evangelical support for Trump and the Republican party. Keep in mind, this podcast was released during the election season and I think it can fairly be described as an extended apologetic for Donald Trump and the GOP.
It’s tricky basing your thesis on insinuation so let us see if it fares well. I confess I didn’t understand what this ‘old saying’ meant. I Googled it and landed here. I’ll leave it to the reader to determine if these quotes accurately capture the cliche’s meaning, but both quotes reveal that Rauser seems to be accusing Craig of lying, a claim that is extremely hard to believe, a claim that needs to meet a hefty burden of proof, a claim that shouldn’t even be insinuated if you aren’t absolutely certain of what you’re talking about, or if you don’t have evidence that all but makes your conclusion nearly unassailable, all of which I don’t think Rauser can deliver on. Here are the quotes interpreting the meaning of the cliche:
Quote 1: “It suggests that the person you're upset with is harming you, making an unbelievably brazen claim that they are not, and that you have seen through their meagre attempt at deception.”
This suggests that Craig is engaged in deception, harming Rauser, and making brazen claims.
Quote 2: “The nuance of the expression is that something bad is being presented as something good, and the speaker is aware of this. – The Raven Jul 21 '11 at 13:11”.
This suggests that Craig is presenting something bad as being good, and that Craig is ‘aware of this’, insinuating again that Craig is maliciously lying about something.
I must confess that when I first read these insinuations I got angry. I’ve met Craig, sat under Craig in three classes for graduate school, went out to eat with him and his wife with all the students, talked with him privately, followed him for the better part of two decades, and when I hear accusations like this leveled at someone I respect, this makes me angry, which lead to the first draft of this blog, a draft that lashed out - wrongly, of course.
So, what evidence does Rauser have that Craig is intentionally lying to his audience, what unbelievably brazen claim is Craig making, how is Craig engaging in meager attempts at deception, what is Craig presenting that Craig knows is bad but presents as good? The claim is that you should vote for Donald Trump and support the GOP and Rauser’s evidence for this claim is that the ReasonableFaith podcast from which the above transcription was lifted ‘. . . can fairly be described as an extended apologetic for Donald Trump and the GOP.’
For me, this evidence is highly dubious and ambiguous. Rauser’s use of ‘can fairly be described’ and ‘extended apologetic’ have to take on meanings so narrow that any other interpretation is off the rails. To see this point, we have to assess Rauser’s evidence for why he thinks we can ‘fairly describe’ the podcast this way. He begins by almost paraphrasing his original thesis:
Nonetheless, throughout the podcast episode, Craig provides a robust defense for Trump and his unflagging evangelical support. Craig says that Trump is pro-life, against gay marriage (our two big-ticket ethical topics) and he supports conservative Supreme Court justices and allegedly stands for religious freedom around the world.
The second sentence is nearly synonymous with the ‘extended apologetic’ sentence above, so it can’t be used as evidence of the latter, but Rauser does mention Trump’s policy positions on Craig’s ‘two big-ticket ethical topics’ (with the added conceptual nuance I brought to your attention above), the Supreme Court justices, and religious freedom around the world. Fair enough. The problem is that merely mentioning these policy positions in no way implies that Craig is providing an extended apologetic for Donald Trump and the GOP, that it can be fairly described as such, or that Craig provides a robust defense for Trump, or a robust defense for why evangelicals should give Trump and the GOP their unflagging support. That’s one interpretation, for sure, one competing explanation for why Craig’s podcast has the content it has, but it definitely is not the only explanation or the only interpretation.
An alternative interpretation - based on the idea that Craig is not lying or deceiving us - is that Craig is providing an explanation for why ‘evangelicals by-and-large support’ Trump. This is where things can go in wildly different directions depending on whether you think Craig is lying. Since I don’t think Craig is lying, I think there’s huge difference between providing an explanation for something (which may involve a rehearsal of the apologetics used by individuals or groups for why they believe you should do something, or why they support something) and providing a robust defense of/extended apologetic for supporting Trump/GOP. Not only are these conceptually distinct, they have entirely different purposes. The first is to merely inform you about why some phenomenon is probably the case (which may involve a description of the arguments individuals/groups use to justify their actions); the second is to persuade/convince you of something. It’s entirely plausible to suggest that (on the supposition that Craig is not lying) Craig is doing the former through the duration of the podcast, not the latter, which perfectly explains Keven Harris’ question before Craig launches into this supposedly ‘extended apologetic’: ‘Why do you think it is that evangelicals by-and-large really do support him?’, he asks. This is a perfect example of an opportunity to explain why some phenomenon is probably the case. Craig does not launch into an apologetic himself, and because of the framing of Harris’ question, I do not think it is fair description to call what Craig is doing an extended apologetic for Trump or a robust defence of Trump, which is in an entirely different domain of discourse, and which is based on the, as yet, dubious proposition that Craig is a secret Trump supporter surreptitiously dog whistling to his audience that they should vote for Trump, in other words, that Craig is deceiving them, or, at the very least, deceitfully saying one thing on a surface level but saying something else under the surface.
A possible explanation for why Rauser opts for the incorrect, uncharitable interpretation is that Rauser is so exercised by what he believes are the unadulterated evils that Trump is so clearly guilty of (which, if you don’t see them, you’re either morally blind or morally egregious yourself) that the mere observation of reasons folks might justifiably have for voting for Trump triggers in his mind the absolute outlandish supposition that there ever can be any such reasons at all, that such reasons could ever convince anyone claiming to be a Christian, and that the presentation of such reasons in any context whatsoever automatically means the presenter is engaging in deceitful polemics on behalf of, or in support of, Trump/GOP. In other words, the mere observation of such reasons in any context whatsoever - even a context of explanation of phenomenon - implies, or plausibly suggests, that whoever has the gull to search for these reasons to provide them in any mode of presentation is itself guilty of platforming what any rationally moral person could see as justification for unadulterated evil, similar to perhaps a fair rehearsal of the reasons bone-headed historians might have for suggesting that the Holocaust didn’t happen.
The Holocaust-example is an apt one. What are we to make of a historian who seeks to explain the phenomenon of why there are Holocaust deniers? In one kind of context of presentation, such a historian may provide the utterly bogus reasons such deniers marshal to justify their case for why the Holocaust didn’t happen. This would be a context wherein the historian is providing an interpretative framework for understanding why some looney subgroup believes the way they do. But it in no way follows that the historian is, therefore, providing an extended apologetic of, or a robust defense for, the Holocaust. However, it would explain why someone who survived the Holocaust, or someone who was a close relative of someone who had survived, or lost someone to, the Holocaust, may read this historian’s exposition (of why a subgroup believes the way they do) and invalidly infer that the historian secretly believes the Holocaust didn’t happen, since these types of people (survivors) are so scarred by what this horrific event is (or what it had done to them personally), that to platform, in any way, any reasons, in any context, to any purpose (even the purpose of historical exposition), plausibly suggests to them that the historian is, on some level, conscious or unconscious, sympathetic to such reasons, displaying too charitable a take on what should be unequivocally condemned, giving to such deniers too much of a semblance of possible rationality in relation to denying one of the worst events of human history. And, therefore, it would explain the extremely easy conflation of someone explaining why something is the case for other people and defending something herself as to why something should be the case.
I believe this kind of explanation applies to Rauser himself, or anyone of his type, who has an absolute disgust, justified or otherwise, for what they are convinced of as Trump’s evils and the selling out of the GOP’s soul in support of him. Rauser acts out, and writes, in perfect consistency from his ethical convictions, or what he believes are valid inferences therefrom, thus applying such convictions and inferences to ethical instances of Trump’s moral shortcomings, in word, deed, and character.
I, and perhaps Craig, would not make the conflation that Rauser is making here, and would not base the claim that Craig is engaged in deception on the basis of this conflation. I believe there is a distinct conceptual difference between providing an explanation of a phenomenon (which involves rehearsing reasons descriptively) and personally endorsing those reasons for the purposes of persuasion. Of course, one is still attempting to persuade someone in the context of explanation for phenomena, but it’s going on on a completely different level, the level of explaining the existence of the phenomenon on the basis of the reasons, not an endorsement of the reasons with the purpose of persuading you to believe as the persons described in the phenomenon believe.
So, Rauser is missing the overall point when he begins to list what he deems are unassailable reasons why Trump is horrid. I’ll quote this section in full because I think the following is just ‘variations on a theme’:
Never mind his defense and praise of dictators (e.g. Putin, Duterte, Xi Jinping), his defense of his good friend MBS who ordered the killing and dismemberment of a US-based journalist, his determined attempts to subvert democratic elections, his demonization of Muslims and defense of white supremacists.
No wait, I’m going to stop myself. If I start enumerating all the examples of how horrible Donald Trump was and what an amoral decrepit shell the GOP that supports him has become, we’ll be here all day. (Side note: the GOP has a handful of morally courageous politicians like Adam Kinzinger and Liz Cheney: may their tribe increase.)
Instead, I’ll simply note that a recent C-Span survey of US historians ranks Trump as the fourth worst president in US history. And there are many reasons that Trump’s reputation is not likely to improve in the future including the following:
the SDNY investigation of the Trump organization beginning with the tax fraud scheme involving CFO Allen Weisselberg;
the multitude of lawsuits against Trump including the Summer Zervos and E. Jean Carroll defamation suits regarding Trump’s denial of sexual assault allegations;
the investigation of the Capitol insurrection;
Trump’s increasingly erratic, vile, and despicable comments, such as his recent statement that he is “the greatest star maker of all time” but that some of his stars “are actually made of garbage” (source);
further shocking accounts of Trump’s utter ineptitude, ignorance, and volatility during his presidency such as the books published just this past week outlining such gems as his praise for Hitler, his desire that John Bolton would die of COVID, and the concern of General Mark Milley that Trump would attempt to use the military in a coup.
First, let me say that none of these instances actually goes to what Craig was attempting to do in his podcast. Craig was attempting to explain the existence of a particular phenomenon, the phenomenon of why evangelicals support Trump/GOP. Rauser’s list of reasons for why Trump is horrid don’t do anything to explain this. If he thinks they do explain it - which is scary - that would imply that it’s probably the case that the majority of evangelicals voted for Trump because of the reasons Rauser listed, which is sheer midsummer madness. Thus, Rauser can’t fault Craig for not mentioning these reasons since these reasons don’t figure into an explanation of the phenomenon that Harris asked about.
But again, it would be unwise of me to begin to address these instances, one-by-one, as it would just commence an interminable debate with both sides walking away exasperated and unmoved. It suffices to say that there is, in existence, a debate about Rauser’s interpretation of these instances, with the conservatives (by and large) taking one side, and liberals taking another. It is important to note that the degree to which one side is convinced of their interpretation may overlap with the degree to which that side thinks the other side is being dishonest or guilty of rank ignorance. But this is a phenomenon that can happen in the context of any heated quarrel. One of the main problems in political discourse today (of which I’ve been guilty of myself as evidenced by my first draft) is that we don’t talk to each other in good faith anymore. We’ve allowed the already high temperature in the room to justify ourselves turning up the temperature even more or fighting fire with fire, meeting the intensity of what one sees as an evil and fighting it with an equal or disportionate intensity of passion motivated by intentions to quash that evil as ruthlessly and as quickly as possible.
With the evangelicals that support Trump, my guess is they might do a couple general things with these instances, or any possible instances that Rauser may bring up (this is off the top of my head and by no means exhaustive). They might enter into debate with Rauser about his interpretation. They might list out what they believe are more egregious instances involved with voting for democrats that make voting the other way, or for a third party, more egregious. They might accept Rauser’s list of instances but think that the good outweighs the bad in terms of their support, tentative or otherwise. Now, Rauser may disagree with the entire case of such evangelicals, in any context where instances are discussed, and think the people that are convinced by such a case are looney or morally bankrupt. But the point is that the people themselves don’t think this, that they sincerely believe what they believe, and interpret themselves as acting in accordance with conscience, acting in accordance with Christian principles. What are such evangelicals to do? Vote contrary to their conscience? I find the contrary hypothesis, that they’re lying or moral idiots, way more outlandish than the hypothesis that these are good people, convinced in their hearts and minds about what they think is the moral thing to do, and that they have authentic convictions in their hearts about what they think is good and right that doesn’t make them moral idiots.
It isn’t surprising why Rauser concludes his blog the way he does. If Craig is lying, if Craig is being deceitful in the podcast, then there is no distinction between (1) presenting explanations for why reasons are endorsed by a group to motivate belief in something for the purpose of description and (2) endorsing the reasons yourself to persuade someone to believe what the reasons suggest. Rauser’s conflation of the two explains why he thinks Craig’s ministry violated the conditions for its tax-exempt status:
William Lane Craig may say that he doesn’t support Trump and the Republican Party. But that appears merely to be a perfunctory attempt to retain the tax-exempt status of his 501(c)(3) organization. Craig’s defense of Trump and the GOP in his May 31, 2020 podcast clearly illustrates practical support for Trump, even if it is technically not recognized as such by the IRS. With Trump already ranked the fourth worst president in US history by historians and with his horrid reputation all but certain to spiral further into the future, we can offer the following conclusion: Craig’s practical support for the man has greatly damaged his apologetic with a skeptical, and morally incensed generation who are appalled by the legacy of the narcissist-in-chief and the evangelical support he has received.
This makes perfect sense only if we already have good reason to think that Craig is being deceitful, but we don’t have good reasons, at least, to me. But it does explain why Rauser believes as he does in this case, which illustrates my point above: if I attempt to explain why Rauser finds Trump horrid, my listing of his reasons for Trump’s evils doesn’t imply that I endorse those reasons myself, or that I’m appropriating those reasons in order to convince or persuade you to despise Trump, or that I’m offering ‘practical support’ for Rauser’s views on Trump, or that I’ve offering a robust apologetic for, or extended defense of, Rauser’s views on Trump. This is the main point. You could only think that if I was being deceitful, if I was being ‘perfunctory’ in my disbelief in whatever Rauser’s reasons are attempting to suggest. If this doesn’t follow as it relates to my explanation for Rauser’s denunciations, then it doesn’t follow with Craig’s explanation for evangelical support for Trump.
Oh, one more thing. At the bottom of the Reasonable Faith website, we read this: “Website design and development by Parscale Digital.“ In case you were wondering, that’s the same Brad Parscale that worked for the Trump campaign. The statement includes a link to the website for Parscale Strategy which features the following quote: “‘[Parscale] absolutely has the Trump campaign on a much more advanced digital footing than I think any other presidential campaign in history.’ Politico.” That aged well, didn’t it?
But more to the point: of all the possible web developers in the country that one could use, why would Reasonable Faith employ the services of Brad Parscale?
Of course, we can only speculate until we ask Craig himself, but in the meantime, let’s speculate and see how our epistemic priors color the data. In this case, so far as I can see, this is another example of Rauser interpreting a piece of data through an interpretive lens that we’ve seen to be groundless: there’s no reason to think that Craig is being deceitful, that Craig has offered practical support of Trump in the relevant sense, that Craig has provided an extended apologetic or robust defense of Trump, that Craig's denials to that effect are ‘perfunctory’, or any of that. There seemed to be a lot of assumption, posturing, and grandstanding.
So, let’s look at it another way. If Craig isn’t lying or being perfunctory, what explains why Brad Parscale is the web designer and developer of the Reasonable Faith website? It’s probable that a substantial demographic of Reasonable Faith viewers are Christian theists, and it’s probable that a substantial demographic of Christian theists are Republican in their politics. It’s probable that of those Republican Christian theists, one of them happened to work for the Trump campaign in 2016. It’s also probable, for all we know, that Parscale reached out to RF ministries to offer his services (we’ll have to ask). But even if he didn’t and they reached out to him, it’s perfectly reasonable to assume that what motivated RF ministries to reach out to him was that he was a good web designer/developer, that RF ministries was informed of his skills by someone, that Parscale was probably within earshot of RF-ministries’ reach in terms of possible contacts via that ‘someone’ (due to Parscale’s image as being conservative in his politics, Republican, that he also offered his services to, or was hired by, the Trump campaign, a Republican campaign, a campaign standing up for those non-negotiable principles mentioned above, etc). Who knows? Again, we’ll have to ask Craig. The point is that there is absolutely no reason to think that Craig secretly supports Trump, that he makes perfunctory statements about his non-support for Trump to not violate his tax-exempt status, on the basis of hiring Parscale in his capacity as the website’s web designer/developer for goodness sakes. There’s just no necessary or probable connection established at all. It’s all suggestion, innuendo, and insinuation. Hiring someone who supports a political candidate of their choice (Trump in this case) to be a web designer/developer is perfectly copasetic in this context, and it’s only if you already have Rauser’s background beliefs, or have good reason to appropriate them here, that you’d be at all suspicious or queasy about this irrelevant piece of data.
