Series: Part 7 of 11: A response to Dr. Wes Morriston

This is a response to Dr. Wes Morriston's essay 'Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and The Actual Infinite.' Much of what I'll say I've already said in the previous six blogs of this series. But I will elaborate if needed. This essay was published in 2010. Morriston has written another essay entitled, 'Craig on the Actual Infinite', published back in 2002. Craig responded to Morriston(2010) in 2010, and Morriston has responded to Craig(2010) in 2012. This will be a response to Morriston(2010) utilizing many of the main points of Craig(2010). In the next blog, I want to briefly unpack Craig(2010). Then I will contend that Morriston(2012)'s reply missed much of what Craig(2010) was trying to say. After this, I will touch on Morriston(2002) to see if there is anything new I can note on the symmetry issues between me and Alex. 

Morriston's points echo Alex's in the main. I'm not sure how much Alex would agree with Morriston's point that 'a series of discrete, success events must - as a matter of metaphysical necessity - have a first member.' I'm not sure about the relevance of such a series having a first member. Oppy presents a series that is of infinite extent, with a first a member that's infinitely far away. The elimination of such a first member would make things worse (of course). Consequently, there might be two kinds of infinite series that are metaphysically impossible. If so, then 'having a first member' isn't a necessary condition for an actually infinite series being metaphysically impossible. Perhaps the future could have an infinitely distant final instant; it would be benign since we would never reach it. It would difficult for such a future to avoid Craig's absurdities, though. But it may be worth pursuing. Tense might still be able to be applied to the past (and elicit the absurdities needed) and render the endless future benign by affirming that the infinitely, distant, final, future instant will never be (because of tense). I don't hold this position myself; I do think it's worth exploring though (intuitively, jumping out of a bottomless pit seems more absurd than jumping off any coherent platform and never bumping your head). 

Right off the bat, Morriston says, ' . . . an endless series of discrete events is not metaphysically impossible,...' I am stuck at Morriston not seeming to satisfy (so far - he could further down) Craig's distinction (that Alex thinks is equivocation) between an endless series of events and an endless future. For my part, this is an absolutely crucial distinction that undermines a major pillar of Morriston's critique. It gets in the way of Morriston's goal: to explain why an endless series of events is not a 'merely potential infinite'. Well, if Morriston is talking about an 'endless future', Craig will agree: an endless future is an actual infinite. That's why Craig makes his distinction between an endless series of events and an endless future. This will imply a similar distinction between a beginningless past and a beginningless series of events. Since it seems that 'tense' is what makes something a series of events in the first place. A beginningless series of events is metaphysically impossible because such a series isn't growing in the earlier-than direction (because of tense, the series of events will involve the direction of time being isochronous); a beginningless past would be metaphysically impossible because of Hilbert-type illustrations. Thus, Morriston is right that there is a conceptual symmetry between an endless future and a beginningless past; but there's a metaphysical asymmetry between such because of tense. But there isn't even a conceptual symmetry between a beginningless and an endless series of events because the concept of such a series seems to me to involve isochronicity. 

1. What's Wrong with the Actual Infinite - Morriston mentions the ideas of 'moving guests around' (Hilbert's Hotel) and the performing of inverse arithmetical operations to elicit metaphysical absurdities. I found this section very informative and I appreciate Morriston for his insightful criticisms. 

My response to Alex in the previous blog had to do with mental annihilation (actually, it's from Craig). Hence, you just mentally annihilate the past events of a beginningless past (not a beginningless series of events, as Morriston once again mistakenly conflates) to elicit the absurdities. And the ineradicable contingent property of engaging in mental annihilation is what renders the collection absurd (even if the engagement doesn't actually obtain). Mentally supposing the collections ultimately ends up being a temporarily entertained antecedent in what is ultimately a necessarily false counterpossible. My contribution is to make the point about the contingency. Craig settles for imaginatively supposing 'what it would be like for a person in room one to be in room two', and so on. At this point, I was excited to see how Morriston would respond here. Alas. I was really disappointed here. First, Morriston just assumes that it's 'metaphysically possible for the guests to be moved'. But that's the question! Second, Morriston just assumes that the moving about of the guests would be akin to 'events' that 'change their temporal locations'. But that's not the comparison that ought to be drawn. Events aren't changing their temporal locations and guests don't have to move about. Events and guests are being mentally annihilated! That is completely different. Hence, the absurdities don't necessarily depend on the moving about of guests or temporal events. The moving about of the guests seems to me to be a mere imaginative option, a fictional supplement designed (not to provide further detail into an indispensable modal property of the Hotel) to increase the level of vividness for whatever aspect of the illustration Craig is wanting to emphasize at the moment. Fourth, Morriston makes the oft-repeated claim that the properties of the infinite are 'simply different' than the properties of the finite. As Craig repeatedly has to point out, he agrees with Morriston here and affirms the mathematical legitimacy of the infinite (he is not a finitist); it no wise follows from this that the infinite can be metaphysically instantiated (the coherency of a concept doesn't imply the possibility of its modal existence). 

2. What about an Endless Series of Future Events - Morriston continues to use nomenclature that doesn't semantically map onto the way Craig delineated the nomenclature [granted that Craig's delineation was written in response to this essay, I think - so he can't be held responsible for it]. An endless series of future events blend together 'endless series of events' and 'endless future'; I think that Morriston would opt for the latter locution as the way to understand 'an endless series of future events'. 

Here Morriston presents his Gabriel and Uriel supposition (which we talked about in previous blogs). Morriston admits that 'they will never arrive at a time at which they have said' all the praises in the endless series of future praises. Here is where tense is important. Why is it that with a so-called (to adopt Morriston's nomenclature) beginningless series of past events will never have a time at which an infinite collection of praises have already been said? The implication seems to be this: if there won't ever be a time at which an infinite collection of praises hasn't already been said (no matter what past praise you pick), and there won't ever be a time at which an infinite collection of praises will ever be said (no matter what future praise you pick), this would seem to me to be a prime candidate for being a symmetry-breaker between a beginningless past and an endless series of events. Per impossible, tense has run its course from the beginningless past to the present moment (not to mention any past event you pick); the present moment (not to mention any past event you pick) is supposed to be a defeater for the idea that the past is beginningless or that the collection of past events has a first member that's infinitely distant. Since tense running its course to arrive at the present moment (not to mention any past event you pick) is impossible, it is also symmetrically impossible for tense to run its course to arrive at an infinitely distant future moment. The difference between the beginningless past and an endless series of events is that the former (but not the latter collection) constitutes a collection every event of which is preceded by an actually infinite number of past events, and the latter (but not the former) constitutes an ever-growing collection every event of which will not be succeeded by an actually infinite number of future events. To attempt to elicit symmetry (by saying that an endless series of events constitutes a collection every event of which is succeeded by an actually infinite number of past events) will be confusing an endless series of events with an endless future, the latter of which Craig denies. 

How many praises will be said in an endless future? Infinitely many. How many praises are yet-to-be-said in an endless future? Infinitely many. How many praises will be said in an endless series of events? Potentially infinitely many. How many praises are yet-to-be said in an endless future? None. This taxonomy seems to me (for now) to be unassailable. 

Hence, God can bring it about that a potentially infinite number of 'distinct praises will be said' because when we're talking about praises that will be said in an endless series of events, we're not talking about the number of praises that will be said in an endless future. It is the latter, not the former, that I believe is metaphysically impossible. 

3. A Merely Potential Infinite - I agree with Morriston that an 'endless series of future praises' is not a potential infinite; a potential infinite is an endless series of praises (an endless series of future praises is synonymous with an endless future). Given Craig's presentism, Morriston alleges that an endless series of future praises isn't 'growing'. I agree. It isn't. But Craig isn't speaking about an endless series of future praises (re endless future - Craig does use Morriston's locution in the Blackwell Companion, which contributed to conceptual confusion a bit); Craig is speaking about an endless series of praises. The locution 'each praise becomes present' seems to me to sneak in J. M. E. McTaggart's mistake of mixing together the ontologies of eternalism and presentism (or A and B theories). There isn't anything in existence (or subsistence) that 'becomes' present (that verb 'becomes' needs a paraphrastic translation of sorts). I attribute it to the ontology of becoming that serves as a truth-maker for the change of tense that propositions undergo as new states of affairs become present. Morriston doesn't provide a semantics. The collection of yet-to-be praises is a collection with zero members. The collection of praises that 'will be' is a collection with an indeterminate fuzziness (because the references to this collection should somehow encompass the inevitable succession of distinct collections, each of which is related to the collection that precedes it in such a way that it includes one more praise than its predecessor - all expect the collection with the 'first' member). In footnote 6, Morriston rejects this by not meaning to imply 'anything about the ontological status of future events'. He opts for something similar to what I just said: 'I could have said that the collection of future-tensed truths about the praisings . . .' I will have something to say in response to Morriston here in the next section (since Morriston says he'll unpack this there). 

Continuing: Morriston is confused about what Craig means by 'increasing toward a limit'. Andrew Ter Ern Loke is helpful here (in his God and Ultimate Origins: A Novel Cosmological Argument):

Craig explains that, because set theory with its definite and distinct elements does not utilize the notion of potential infinity, a set containing a potentially infinite number of members is impossible, indeed no set could capture the essential dynamic character of potential infinite. Such a collection would be one in which the membership is not definite in number but may be increased without limit. It would best be described as indefinite. Against Oppy's tenseless characterisations of potential infinite (Oppy 2006, pp. 261-264; cf. pp. 244-245), Craig observers that a major shortcoming of these characterizations is that they are incapable of handling dynamic views of time which regard tense and temporal becoming as objective features of reality, and hence, worlds in which the future is potentially infinite in the sense of growing toward infinity as a limit (Craig 2008, 201-208). In contrast with aleph-zero, which is a number, ∞ is used for infinite understood as a limit.

This agrees with our analysis above. The sense in which a potential infinite increases toward a limit is in terms of the indefinite perpetuity of the characteristics of the members of such a collection. So, Morriston characterization of the 'series of praises yet to be said' does not fit this description. Such a series is a collection with a transfinite number of members. Hence, it's not a potential infinite. The series of an endless future does not increase toward infinity as a limit. This is why Craig denies it and contrasts it with the endless series of praises, which is increasing toward infinity as a limit. This latter series isn't a 'collection of definite and discrete members'. As Loke pointed out, the collection is indefinite, even if discrete. In Time and Eternity (2001), Craig confirms this: "A potential infinite is a collection that is increasing toward infinity as a limit but never gets there. Such a collection is really indefinite, not infinite" (221). Indefiniteness seems to be the necessary/sufficient condition. Morriston even admits that the series he's speaking about (yet to be future praises) is 'definite'! And when he does speak about it, he reintroduces the idea of 'will be', and yet-to-be is temporally set aside. It's this almost imperceptible succession between these two locutions (along with Alex's allegation against Craig of equivocation and his suspicion that the two locutions are synonymous) that is one of the sources for why Morriston's critique dashes itself on the rocks every time! Morrison's citation of a non-analytic, poetic expression of Heavenly bliss in a Hymn-lyric hardly qualifies as a sufficient explanation. Moreover, appeals to the definite nature of God's omniscience (do motivate 'definiteness' in the collection of future praises) doesn't do justice to the distinctions we appealed to in a previous blog. Curiously, Morriston thinks an appeal to God's omniscience isn't 'essential' to his argument; I'm sure I see why. This seems to me to be the only route to motivate the idea that collection of future praises is definite. 

Morriston's plea that 'for any number n, praise number n will be said' completely begs the question, and surreptitiously substitutes the one locution over the other. Morriston's questions (regarding the idea that 'before any event in the imagined series had occurred, another had already occurred') ignore Craig's point that tense actually regards any event in the beginningless past metaphysically impossible (because, for any event you pick, a transfinite number of events precede such an event). 

4. Presentism to the Rescue? - Morriston asks us how many praises will be said if God determines that ten praises will be said. The answer is ten, of course. Why is this a difficulty? Why this collection is indefinite isn't explained. It is definite: the collection has ten members. But I'm not referring to the collection of yet-to-be praises, a collection with zero members. That locution commits me to the subsistence or existence of future praises. The collection of future praises that 'will be' (if the collection will have ten members) 'will have' ten members, and the collection that will have ten members has a definite characteristic: that it will have ten members. If the praises increase 'without ceasing', then it's a potential infinite, and therefore, indefinite (and this is because of tense). The same does 'not' apply to the beginningless past because tense doesn't regress in the earlier-than direction. An objection is: tense might not regress in the earlier-than direction - but (per impossible) it 'has' progressed in the later-than direction to the present instant (not to mention any past instant you pick. But because this traversal is impossible, no instant in the past series can ever be reached, including the present instant. The mere non-existence of the past or the future isn't the issue and it was never meant to be the sufficient issue. It would definitely necessary; it's just not sufficient. The difference between the past and the future doesn't have to do existence, but with actuality, as Morriston notes. Morriston calls this 'puzzling'. Morriston alleges that the actuality of the past is incompatible with presentism. Not so. Actuality doesn't imply existence. Being a 'determinate part of reality' does not imply that the determinate parts of reality (in terms of actuality) actually exist. And this doesn't even have anything do with subsistence versus existence. Craig says: "The actual world thus includes both what does exist and what did exist. But events which have yet to take place, being pure potentialities, are, on a tensed view of time, not part of the actual world" (Taking Tense Seriously, Craig). Craig, in footnote 'v', says,

The lesson of McTaggart’s Paradox is that, if we take tense seriously, there can be no maximal description of reality such as is imagined in possible worlds semantics, which provide purely tenseless descriptions of the way the world might be. For an attempt to introduce tense into possible worlds semantics, see William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Synthese Library 293 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 208-10.

Once the 'endless future' is cashed out in terms of 'yet to be' events, the locution 'yet to be' seems synonymous with 'later than' or 'earlier than', all of which are tenseless descriptions, semantically distinct from 'was the case' and 'will be the case'. This absolutely pivotal distinction I will be looking for in Morriston's reply to Craig's reply. If a tensed theory of time is correct, tenseless descriptions of those events that are 'later than' the present (or are 'yet to be' present) will not be a part of the actual world because such descriptions pertain to maximal descriptions of reality. And an ineradicable, indispensable part of reality (for the presentist) is tense. The reason that the past is a part of the actual world (reality) in a way that the future is not is that 'tense' has 'actually' 'exited their causes and are therefore no longer in potentiality' (Craig). Pure potentiality encompasses those things, events, and states of affairs, persons, and objects that are not, and have not ever been, actualized. The only way out (for Alex and Morriston) is to stay that such things 'will be' actualized. But if it will be, then it hasn't yet. If it hasn't yet, it 'is' merely potential. If merely potential, then not 'presently' actual. The past is not potential and so the past, even if it does not 'exist' anymore (as with the future), it is still 'presently' actual. That seems to me to be an elegant, decisive symmetry breaker between a beginningless past and an endless series of events (the past is presently actual and the future is presently potential - even though the past and the future do not exist). 

That is all for now.